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SUMMARYRecently published international rankings indicate that the perfor-
mance gap between European and American universities is large and, in
particular, that the best European universities lag far behind the best American
universities. The country performance index we construct using the Shanghai
ranking confirms that, despite the good performance of some countries,
Europe as a whole trails the US by a wide margin.The reason for this situation,
which contributes to Europe’s lagging growth performance, is two-fold. First,
Europe invests too little in higher education. Total public and private spending
on higher education in EU25 accounts for barely 1.3% of GDP, against 3.3% in
the US. This translates into average spending of less than €10,000 per student
in EU25 versus more than €35,000 in the US. Second, European universities
suffer from poor governance, insufficient autonomy and often perverse
incentives. Our own survey of European universities shows that both factors
contribute to the EU’s poor performance and that reform should take place on
both fronts, because autonomy also increases the efficiency of spending.
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If Europe is to be a leader in the global
knowledge economy – and if universities
are to produce the top-level research 
needed to achieve this – comprehensive
reform of higher education is the order 
of the day. While there is more than one 
university system that works, most
European countries should invest an
extra one percent of their GDP in higher
education each year. The extra funding
may be public or private. To make this
additional funding ‘bite’, universities
should be given more autonomy in 
budgets, hiring and remuneration.
WHY REFORM 
EUROPE’S UNIVERSITIES?
Source: Bruegel country 
performance index, see Table 1.
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WHY REFORM EUROPE’S UNIVERSITIES?
EUROPEAN growth has been disap-
pointing for the last 30 years but
policymakers have only recently
started to realise that Europe’s
growth performance is intimately
linked with the research perfor-
mance of its universities. 
Europe invests too little in higher
education. It is generally known
that the European Union (EU)
spends less than two percent of its
GDP on research and development
(R&D), compared to more than 2.5
percent in the United States (US).
But the gap between Europe and
the US is even wider for spending
on universities than for R&D. In
2001, total (public and private)
spending on higher education in
EU25 accounted for barely 1.3 per-
cent of GDP, against 3.3 percent in
the US. In other words, every year
Europe spends two percent of GDP
less than the US.  In terms of expen-
diture per student, the contrast is
starker still, with an annual spend
of €8,700 in EU25 versus €36,500
in the US.
But the unsatisfactory research
performance of Europe’s universi-
ties also results from inadequate
institutions. European universities
suffer from poor governance,
insufficient autonomy and often
perverse incentives.   
Europe started to recognise some
years ago that its university system
faces a problem. A first step was 
the Bologna Declaration which ini-
tiated the creation of a ‘European
Higher Education Area’.  Recently, a
growing number of individual EU
member states have introduced
reforms of their university systems. 
However, it is the recent publication
of global rankings, such as the
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Academic Ranking of World
Universities (the ‘Shanghai ran-
king’), which has made most policy-
1 This policy brief does
not deal with all the
various roles and
functions of univer-
sities, solely their
research function.
An upcoming
Bruegel Blueprint
will provide a fuller
analysis of how uni-
versities perform
against a broader
set of objectives.
Furthermore, this
policy brief does
not discuss the
potential of EU-level
policy to add value.
This will also be
dealt with in the
upcoming Blueprint.
by the publication, since 2003, of
the  Shanghai ranking which mea-
sures university research perfor-
mance. Constructed by a group of
Chinese scholars, the Shanghai ran-
king is a weighted average of six dif-
ferent indicators (see Box 1). While
the weights are admittedly somew-
hat arbitrary, the main advantage of
the index is its reliance on publicly
available information.  
Table 1 presents a detailed account
of relative country performance,
looking successively at the Top 50,
Top 100, Top 200 and Top 500 uni-
versities in the Shanghai ranking.
To understand how to read this
table, consider first the column 'Top
50'. The best university in the Top
50 is given a score of 50, the next
best university is given 49, and so
on, down to a score of 1 for the
lowest performing university
within the Top 50. For each country
(or region), we then compute the
sum of Top 50 Shanghai rankings
that belong to this country, and
divide the sum by the country's
population. Finally, all the country
scores are divided by the US score,
so that each entry in the column
‘Top 50’ can be interpreted as a
fraction of the US per capita perfor-
mance for the Top 50 universities.
This gives our Country
Performance Index for the Top 50
universities. The same logic
applies, respectively, to the ‘Top
makers aware of the magnitude of
the problem and sparked a public
debate on university reform. 
The purpose of this policy brief is
to examine what reforms are nee-
ded in order to enable European
universities to produce world-
class research and thus make the
optimum contribution to growth
1. 
In the first section of this brief, we
draw conclusions from the
Shanghai ranking both about
European university research per-
formance in relation to that of US
institutions and about differences
in performance between European
countries. We then report on our
own survey of European universi-
ties listed in the Shanghai ranking,
which we use to establish what
determines university research
performance.  We also use compre-
hensive US data to analyse the
interplay between autonomy and
funding in boosting university
research performance.  Finally, we
make concrete proposals about
how to improve the conditions for
research at European universities
with the objective of improving
their contribution to growth. 
1. COUNTRY PERFORMANCE
The debate on the funding and
governance of European universi-
ties has been stirred considerably
Box 1: The Shanghai ranking
This index aggregates six different indicators of research performance:
• The number of alumni from the university winning Nobel Prizes in physics, chemistry,
medicine, and economics and Fields Medals in mathematics. 
• The number of university faculty winning Nobel Prizes in physics, chemistry, medicine,
and economics and Fields Medals in mathematics.
• The number of articles (co-)authored by university faculty published in Nature and
Science.
• The number of articles (co-)authored by university faculty published in Science Citation
Index Expanded and Social Sciences Citation Index. 
• The number of highly cited researchers from the university in 21 broad subject categories.
• The academic performance with respect to the size of the university.
Note that the Shanghai ranking tends to undervalue countries where a great deal of academic
scientific research takes place outside universities (the Max Planck Institutes in Germany)
or in centres whose researchers are affiliated with several universities (the CNRS laborato-
ries in France). This partly explains the poor performance of France and Germany in Table 1. WHY REFORM EUROPE’S UNIVERSITIES?
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100’, ‘Top 200’ and ‘Top 500’
columns, where the best university
receives a score of, respectively,
100, 200 and 500, and the last one
receives a score of 1. There are,
obviously, fewer zero entries in a
column as one moves from the Top
50 to the Top 500 as it is easier for
a country to have universities
appearing in the Top 500 than in
the Top 50. 
Table 1 reveals several interesting
findings:
• First, the United States comple-
tely dominates all European coun-
tries in the Top 50 universities.
Only Switzerland and the United
Kingdom rival the US on a per
capita basis. By contrast, the EU15
and EU25, with a greater popula-
tion than the US, score much lower.
• Second, the top 4 US states
(Massachusetts, California, New
York and Pennsylvania) score bet-
ter than any European state in the
Top 50 and Top 100.
• Third, country performance gaps
close as one enlarges the number
of universities considered. In parti-
cular, the gap between the EU15 or
the EU25 and the US narrows as
one moves from the Top 50 to the
Top 500. In part this is due to the
way the scores are constructed,
but it mostly reflects a reality:
American universities dominate
European universities in the top
tier (the Top 50 and Top 100), but
Europe has many good universi-
ties in the second (the next 100)
and the third (the next 300) tiers.
• Fourth, there are major differences
among European countries:
Switzerland, the UK and Sweden do
particularly well, even in the Top
100, where they outperform
(Switzerland and Sweden) or
almost match (the UK) the United
States on a per capita basis. Other
Nordic countries (Denmark and
Finland), Belgium and the
Netherlands also do fairly well in the
Top 200 and Top 500. In contrast,
southern and eastern Europe lag far
behind. France and Germany do
relatively poorly, except in the third
tier, the universities ranked bet-
ween 301 and 500.
2. WHAT EXPLAINS RESEARCH
PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE?
An obvious starting point for eco-
nomists is money. Table 2 pre-
sents aggregate data on the levels
of private and public expenditure
on higher education across coun-
tries. The main findings are that:
• Richer countries spend relatively
more on higher education than poo-
rer countries.
• The US spends a lot more on higher
education than any European coun-
try, especially thanks to private fun-
ding. But public spending alone is
relatively higher than in the EU.
• The Nordic countries also spend a
lot, with most of the money coming
from public sources. 
• The UK spends surprisingly little
(more on this later). 
There is a strong positive correlation
between expenditure per student
Table 1: Country performance index (US= 100)
Country
Population Shanghai ranking
(millions) Top 50  Top 100  Top 200  Top 500
Austria 8 0 0 0 53
Belgium 10 0 0 61 122
Czech Republic 10 0 0 0 13
Denmark 5 0 75 114 161
Finland 5 0 46 75 81
France 60 3 15 29 45
Germany 83 0 17 37 67
Greece 11 0 0 0 12
Hungary 10 0 0 0 13
Ireland 4 0 0 0 50
Italy 58 0 0 11 34
Netherlands 16 20 51 76 131
Poland 38 0 0 0 4
Spain 43 0 0 0 14
Sweden 9 7 117 179 217
UK 60 72 86 98 124
EU15 383 13 26 41 67
EU25 487 10 21 32 54
Australia 20 0 31 66 101
Canada 32 39 54 63 104
Japan 128 14 17 24 27
Norway 5 0 66 91 107
Switzerland 7 97 166 228 230
US 294 100 100 100 100
California 36 234 199 163 103
Massachusetts                 6 449 308 302 263
New York 19 196 167 139 148
Pennsylvania 12 111 177 161 115
Texas 23 33 61 83 103
Source: Bruegel computation based on the Shanghai Jiao Tong University Academic Ranking of
World Universities (2006).              
Note: All figures are rounded.b
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WHY REFORM EUROPE’S UNIVERSITIES?
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 US
and country performance (measu-
red by the Top 500 performance
values in Table 1), as shown in
Figure 1. 
However, these aggregate data do
not indicate how the money is split
between higher education institu-
tions, in particular between
research-oriented and teaching-
oriented universities. In the
remainder of this section we there-
fore present the results of a survey
questionnaire which elicits infor-
mation on individual budgets and
on the governance of top research
performers.
A survey of European universities
A survey questionnaire was sent
to the European universities in the
2006 Top 500 Shanghai ranking
2.
We received 71 responses, an
overall response rate of 36 percent,
which can be considered very
satisfactory. We decided to focus
on the ten countries for which the
response rate was at least 25 per-
cent and the number of respon-
dents at least two
3.  This left us with
a total sample of 66 universities,
with an average response rate of
41 percent for the ten countries
considered. We were able to check
that, for each country, respondent
universities have an average
Shanghai 500 rank fairly close to
that of the whole population of uni-
versities from that country, so that
we could be satisfied of the repre-
sentativity of our sample
4.  
Table 3 provides country averages
on a variety of dimensions
5.  It
confirms the high degree of hete-
rogeneity between countries for
the universities in the Top 500:
•Southern European countries
(Italy and Spain)  have very large
(more than 40 thousand students
on average) but not well-funded
universities. 
• Sweden and the Netherlands
have universities of average size
(20-25 thousand students), and
better funded.
•The UK and Switzerland have
small (10-15 thousand students)
2The 2006 Shanghai
ranking includes
roughly 200
European universi-
ties belonging to
the EU25 and
Switzerland.
3The ten countries are:
Belgium (4 responses
out of 7 universities in
the Shanghai 500 ran-
king), Denmark (2 out
of 5), Germany (11 out
of 40), Ireland (2 out of
3), Italy (9 out of 23),
Netherlands (4 out of
12), Spain (6 out of 9),
Sweden (5 out of 11),
Switzerland (6 out of 8)
and the UK (17 out of
43). We left out France,
because only 4 out of
21 universities respon-
ded and, moreover, uni-
versity budgetary data
are not comparable
with those of other
countries.
4In fact, respondents
had a somewhat higher
rank for all countries
except for Spain.
5We obtain very similar
results when looking at
medians rather than
averages.
Source: European Commission, DG Research, for expenditure as percent of GDP. Figures in
euros per student were obtained by applying these percentages to GDP and dividing by the
number of full-time equivalent students.
*  Not available. Note: Not PPP converted.
Table 2: Public and private expenditure on higher education, 2001
As % of GDP In thousand euros per student
Country Public Private Total Public Private Total
Austria 1.4 0.1 1.5 11.0 0.5 11.5
Belgium 1.4 0.2 1.6 10.6 1.6 12.2
Czech Republic      0.8 0.1 0.9 2.3 0.4 2.7
Denmark 2.7 0.0 2.7 25.6 0.4 26.0
Finland 2.1 0.1 2.2 10.3 0.3 10.6
France 1.0 0.2 1.2 7.5 1.2 8.7
Germany 1.1 0.1 1.2 11.5 0.9 12.4
Greece 1.2 0.0 1.2 3.3 0.0 3.3
Hungary 1.1 0.3 1.4 2.6 0.6 3.2
Ireland 1.2 0.2 1.4 9.7 1.6 11.3
Italy 0.8 0.2 1.0 5.6 1.4 7.0
Netherlands 1.3 0.3 1.6 13.0 2.7 15.7
Poland 1.1 -* -* 1.7 -* -*
Spain 1.0 0.3 1.3 4.0 1.2 5.2
Sweden 2.1 0.2 2.3 18.9 1.8 20.7
UK 0.8 0.3 1.1 8.4 3.1 11.5
EU25 1.1 0.2 1.3 7.3 1.4 8.7
Japan 0.5 0.6 1.1 6.5 7.3 13.8
US 1.5 1.8 3.3 16.6 19.9 36.5
Figure 1: Relationship between expenditure 
per student and country performance
Source: Country performance index: Table 1; Expenditure per student: Table 2.WHY REFORM EUROPE’S UNIVERSITIES?
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and very well funded universities.
Comparing with the aggregate
information on expenditure in
Figure 1, one observes that the UK
significantly favours top research
performers since the universities
in our sample (which belong to the
group of top universities) have a
budget per student about twice as
large as the average for all univer-
sities in the country.
There is also a great deal of hetero-
geneity – albeit with some general
trends – as far as university gover-
nance is concerned:
• State intervention is clearly per-
vasive, even when universities are
not public.
• Wage-setting autonomy is rare,
with Sweden and the UK being the
prime exceptions.
• Building ownership by the univer-
sity is commonplace (except in the
Nordic countries and Switzerland).
• Hiring autonomy is prevalent,
except in southern Europe. 
• Endogamy (measured as the per-
centage of faculty trained in house
at PhD level) seems to be negatively
correlated with country size: it is
high in small countries (Belgium,
Denmark, Ireland and Sweden, but
not in Switzerland which is highly
open to hiring scholars with PhDs
from other institutions), and small
in large countries (Germany, Italy
and the UK, but not in Spain). This
finding clearly reflects the absence
of significant academic mobility
between European countries.
A striking fact is thus the high
variance in university governance
across European countries, even
among those which are performing
well in terms of research. For exam-
ple, among the three European
countries with the best perfor-
mance index, endogamy is high in
Sweden but low in Switzerland and
the UK, and universities are mostly
public in Denmark, Sweden and
Switzerland whereas they are
mostly private in the Netherlands
and the UK.
One dimension where there is little
variance across European coun-
tries is the age of universities. Top
European universities are old insti-
tutions: the average age of the 66
universities in our sample is nearly
300 years. It ranges from 220
years in the Netherlands to 450
years in Italy. The only outlier is
Denmark where the average age is
only 60 years. This suggests that
European universities have much
accumulated knowledge, but may
also be complicated to reform. 
Preliminary evidence
Our survey allows us to examine
how budget per student and
various measures of university
governance correlate with
research performance as measu-
red by the Shanghai ranking. Table
4 shows that the research perfor-
mance of a university is:
• positively correlated with the size
of its budget per student: the higher
Table 3: Characteristics of the universities in the sample (country averages)
Country Age 
(years)
Number 
of students
(thousands)
Budget per
student 
(1 000€)*
Public 
status
+
Budget
autonomy
§
Building 
ownership
§
Hiring 
autonomy
§
Wage-setting
autonomy
§
Faculty with
in-house
PhD (%)
Belgium 284 21.7 11.3 0.5 0.4 1.0 1.0 0.0 63
Denmark 59 18.2 11.4 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 40
Germany 289 26.2 9.6 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.8 0.0 40
Ireland 259 16.3 12.7 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.0 49
Italy 444 44.9 10.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.4 0.0 24
Netherlands 217 21.4 20.5 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.2 33
Spain 342 44.8 7.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 69
Sweden 266 27.1 16.2 0.8 0.8 0.2 1.0 1.0 58
Switzerland 326 12.8 26.2 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.0 24
UK 242 14.6 24.5 0.5 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.8 8
Total 290 24.9 16.1 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.3 29
Source: Bruegel survey.
* PPP adjusted.  
+1 if public, 0 if private.  
§1 if yes, 0 if no. 
Table 4: Correlation between 
budget and university governance,
and research performance*
Characteristics Correlation 
coefficient
Budget per student +0.61
University governance:
Public status
+ -0.35
Budget autonomy
§ +0.16
Building autonomy
§ -0.01
Hiring autonomy
§ +0.20
Wage setting autonomy
§ +0.27
Faculty with 
in-house PhD 
-0.08
* Measured by the (logarithm of the)
Shanghai ranking
+1 if public, 0 if private.  
§1 if yes, 0 if no.WHY REFORM EUROPE’S UNIVERSITIES?
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the budget per student, the better
the performance;
• negatively correlated with its
degree of public ownership: pri-
vate universities perform better
than public institutions;
• positively correlated with its
budget autonomy: not being requi-
red to have its budget approved by
governmental authorities is asso-
ciated with better performance;
• not correlated with its building
ownership: more autonomy with
respect to buildings is not associa-
ted with better performance;
• positively correlated with its
hiring and wage-setting auto-
nomy: universities that decide on
faculty hiring and set faculty
wages do better;
• negatively correlated with its
degree of endogamy in faculty
hiring: universities which tend to
hire their own graduates as faculty
do less well.
Taken together these results sug-
gest that the research perfor-
mance of a university is positively
affected by all our measures of
university autonomy (except for
building ownership), and also by
funding. However, they do not tell
us: (i) which of these autonomy
indicators dominates and how
interrelated they are; (ii) whether
funding and autonomy improve
performance separately from one
another, or whether there are posi-
tive interactions between the two.
We now try to answer these ques-
tions with appropriate statistical
instruments. 
Funding and autonomy
We use ‘regression analysis’, a sta-
tistical technique for the investiga-
tion of relationships between
variables, to assess the effect of
budget and governance on
research performance as measu-
red by Shanghai rankings.
We are interested in the effect of
budget and university governance
on university research perfor-
mance. However we need to begin
by taking into account two other
factors that also affect Shanghai
rankings, our measure of univer-
sity research performance. The
first is the size of the university. All
other things being equal, larger
institutions are likely to have a
better Shanghai ranking because
they have more researchers. We do
not have data on the number of
researchers in our survey so we
proxy the size of the university by
the number of students. The
second factor is the age of the uni-
versity. All other things being
equal, older institutions may have
a better Shanghai ranking because
they have more alumni.
As expected, the regression analy-
sis indicates that the research per-
formance of universities is positi-
vely associated with their size and
their age. More importantly, it also
confirms the existence of a positive
linkage between budget per stu-
dent and research performance.
These effects are statistically signi-
ficant. Once these three important
factors (size, age and money) are
taken into account, it turns out that
one of the six governance indica-
tors reported in Table 4, namely
budget autonomy, has a statisti-
cally significant effect on research
performance. The others have no
statistical impact on performance.
But our main result is not simply
that more money or more auto-
nomy is good for research perfor-
mance. It is that more money has
much more impact when it is com-
bined with budget autonomy. To be
more precise: we find that having
budget autonomy doubles the
effect of additional money on uni-
versity research performance.  
Hence, increasing budget per 
student helps research perfor-
mance, and having budget auto-
nomy doubles this beneficial effect.
This message, based on the
research performance of European
universities, is reinforced by an ana-
lysis of US universities .
3. LESSONS FROM US EVIDENCE
The United States provide a wealth
of information that can be used to
go one step further in the analysis
of research performance. We have
access to a rich data set across US
states and over time on education
spending and patenting. For each
state, we have annual information
on university funding and gover-
nance and on patenting. We are
able, therefore, to examine the
effect of university funding and
governance on innovation activity
directly, rather than solely on uni-
versity research performance. 
There is considerable variation in
university governance across
states. States vary not only in the
relative importance of private ver-
sus public universities, but also in
the degree of autonomy granted by
state authorities to public universi-
ties. Sometimes, even neighbou-
ring states display sharp diffe-
rences in governance. For instance,
public universities in Illinois enjoy
on average rather low autonomy,
Table 5: Effect of budget 
and autonomy on 
research performance*
Variable
Effect on research
performance
Size of the university  +
Age of the university +
Budget per student +
Budget autonomy +
Interaction between
budget and autonomy
+
* Measured by the (logarithm of the)
Shanghai rankingWHY REFORM EUROPE’S UNIVERSITIES?
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6Philippe Aghion, 
Leah Boustan, Caroline
Hoxby and Jerome
Vandenbussche,
Exploiting States’
Mistakes to Evaluate
the Impact of Higher
Education on Growth,
mimeo, Harvard
(2007).
while their neighbours in Ohio
enjoy  high autonomy. These diffe-
rences are persistent over time
and often go back to the idiosyn-
cratic origin of American universi-
ties, which in turn reflect diffe-
rences in the preferences of univer-
sity founders (eg  Benjamin
Franklin founded the private
University of Pennsylvania, whe-
reas Thomas Jefferson was the
founder of the public University of
Virginia).
Our strategy is to take US states'
differences in university autonomy
as given and then ask the following
question: Does a given investment
in higher education produce more
patenting in a US state if universi-
ties in that state are more autono-
mous? The details of the statistical
test are reported in Box 2. The ans-
wer to our question is a resounding
‘yes’. As illustrated in Figure 2, the
effect of additional spending on
patenting is roughly twice as high
for states with more university
autonomy. Autonomy therefore
greatly enhances the efficiency of
spending. This result confirms and
nicely complements the one from
Section 2.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this brief we have investigated
the relationship between univer-
sity governance and funding on
the one hand and various mea-
sures of performance on the other
hand. In the first section we have
tried to link our Country
Performance Index based on the
Shanghai ranking of universities to
different aspects of university
governance drawn from a survey
questionnaire. In the second sec-
tion of the brief we have assessed
how university autonomy affects
the patenting impact of university
research funding.
Several interesting findings come
out of our investigation. 
First, the performance gap bet-
ween Europe and America is large,
in particular for the best-perfor-
ming universities. 
Second, as we broaden the investi-
gation from the Top 50 to the Top
500 universities in the Shanghai
ranking, the relative performance
of European countries improves
compared to the US. This, in turn,
suggests strongly that quality
variance is lower among European
universities than among their
American counterparts. It also sug-
gests that what Europe lacks most
is top-class universities. 
Third, there is more than one model
of university system that appears
to work. For example, both
Switzerland and Sweden are doing
well with mostly public universities,
while the UK also performs well
with a higher share of private uni-
versities, but also higher tuition
fees and a higher degree of stu-
dent selection. The UK, however,
differs significantly from
Switzerland and Sweden in one
respect. All three perform very well
in the top tier (Top 50 and Top
100), but the UK performs relati-
vely less well in the remainder of
the Top 500. This is due to the fact
that the UK concentrates its less
than average higher education
budget (in terms of GDP) heavily
on its top institutions.
Indeed, a fourth lesson is that
money helps performance.
Fifth, autonomy is good for
research performance. 
Box 2: University funding, autonomy and innovation: 
data and methodology
Data
For research expenditure, we use the detailed data in Aghion et al (2007)
6on how
much each state spent on each type of education in all years from 1947 to 2004.  We
know in particular from these time series how much each US state spent on a given
cohort of individuals (eg born in year X) in each year. Thus we know how much was
spent on average on each individual at every stage of his or her studies (from primary
school to post-graduate college).
For governance, we consider two alternative measures of university autonomy at the
state level: (i) the percentage of universities that are private, keeping in mind that pri-
vate universities are, on average, more autonomous than public universities; (ii) an
aggregate autonomy index for public universities, which is constructed on the basis of
several component factors. This index takes the maximum value when the public uni-
versities in the state: (a) set their own faculty salaries; (b) set their own tuition fees;
(c) have lump-sum budgeting (as opposed to line item budgeting); (d) can shift funds
among major expenditure categories; (e) retain and control tuition revenue and/or
grants; (f) have no ceiling on external faculty positions (and therefore need not hire
faculty internally); (g) have no ceiling on external non-faculty positions (administra-
tors or technicians); (h) have freedom from pre-audits of their expenditure; (i) can
carry over year-end balances (rather than returning them to the state). It emerges
that, as in the case of European universities, the most statistically important compo-
nent factor of this aggregate index is budget autonomy.
Statistical test
We examine the effect on patenting in a US state of increasing research education fun-
ding by $1,000 per year and per person over a sustained period, respectively in states
with highly autonomous universities and in states with less autonomous universities.
Figure 2 illustrates a key result from our test: states with highly autonomous universi-
ties enjoy an accumulated impact of research education funding on innovation which is
roughly twice as high as that enjoyed by states with less autonomousuniversities.WHY REFORM EUROPE’S UNIVERSITIES?
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Sixth, autonomy and funding are
complementary: more autonomy
increases the extent to which addi-
tional research funding improves
performance. 
Policy lessons
What should be done to improve
the performance of European uni-
versities? 
1. European countries should
invest more in their university
systems. On average, EU25
members spend 1.3 percent of
GDP on higher education,
against 3.3 percent in the US.
European countries should
increase higher education fun-
ding by at least one percentage
point over the next ten years. It
remains an open question how
public budgets and private fun-
ding including tuition fees can
share the burden of this
increase.
2. For this effort to pay off,
European universities should
become more autonomous, in
particular with regard to bud-
gets, and also in hiring, remu-
neration, course design and
student selection, particularly
at Master’s level. What matters
for good performance is both
money and good governance.
The two are complementary:
increasing university budgets
has more impact with good
governance and improving
governance has more impact
with higher budgets. We are
aware, however, that greater
autonomy can be perverse and
that it must be accompanied by
greater performance evaluation.
Of course this brief has focused
mainly on the research function of
universities and has left aside poli-
tically sensitive issues of tuition
fees and student selection, which
are perhaps more directly related
to the teaching function, although
they also impact on research. Yet
we are confident that a reform
stressing increased budget per
student and greater autonomy
(together with greater evaluation)
will be performance enhancing,
either alone or as part of a more
radical overhaul of the university
system, involving tuition fees and
student selection. So far, our par-
tial evidence, which will be further
examined in a forthcoming Bruegel
Blueprint, leads us to believe that
there is more than one university
system that works and, therefore,
that there are diverse paths to uni-
versity reform.
We are very grateful to Aida Caldera,
Indhira Santos and Alexis Walckiers
for their excellent research assis-
tance, and to colleagues across
European universities in helping
with the university survey  used in
Source: Authors’ own computations.
Note: The increase in expenditure is assumed to last from year 1 to 6. The effect on patenting
accordingly starts in year 2, peaks in years 10 and 11, and ends in year 20. 
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Figure 2: Effects on patents of an increase in higher education 
expenditure, states with high autonomy vs. low autonomy universities
Effects on patents per million people
Year
States with high autonomy universities
States with low autonomy universities